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964
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
cognised by the Blessed Lord Buldha--that Cognition and Buddha's Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together,-i.e. at the same time, --and yet they are different. Similarly in the ens of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended together!, yet they are not one und the same. Thus tho Reason is Inconclusive
All this is not right. What is meant in, not apprehension by one', nor apprehension of one'; what is meant is that there is a single-not separate-apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised ; that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Coghised. In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also ;-nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reuson be regarded as
inadmissible'Y-Nor can the Reason be regarded as of doubtful admissibility ; because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as luas been aclmitted also by our opponent, the upholler of the Reality of the External World. This also serves to refute the inadmissibility' urged on the basis of the alternatives-whether what is meant is the apprehension of one', otc. etc.-Then again, it is not a fact that the
Cognition-moments' figuring in another chain are cognised by the Bruldha. Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from all olscuring influences, is entirely free from dofects as those of the apprehender' and the apprehended'. This has been thus declared-For Him, there is no Apprehender, nor Apprehension, nor Apprehensibility by other Cognitions; it is pure Void'.-As regards the declaration of being untrammelled ' inade in regard to Buddha's Cognition),--that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things; as has been declared in the following words - He is held to be omniscient, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations, -as is going to be described later on'. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as inadmissible!
Says the Opponent :-“Acharya Dharmakirti, in setting forth the Purvapaksa (the Opponent's view), says-- At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later'; and here he has shown that what the term 'together' means is simultaneity, not sameness ; it is only when simultaneity is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant ".
There is no force in this argument. Because difference in time is included under real material difference; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the less wide' term should not be inconcomitant with the 'wider' term.
Nor again can the Reason be regarded as Inconclusive , in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddhas ; because in that case there is no limita
tion of the Cognition being one; because one by one all the Buddhas cognise . the Cognition. For this same reason, in their case also, there is
