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934
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
TEXTS (2077-2078).
IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THERE COULD BE NO REMEMBRANCE IN THE FORM some OBJEOT HAD BEEN APPREHENDED '; FOR REMEMBRANCE IS NEVER COGNISED AS A PIECE OF PURE ROCK-CRYSTAL.- THE TWO LAST REASONS (CITED BY Kumärila) ALSO ARE CLEARLY
INCONCLUSIVE', IN VIEW OF SUCH COGNITIONS AS THAT OF THE Yellow CONCH-SHELL ',- THIS IS THE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER REASONS
ALSO.-(2077-2078)
COMMENTARY.
If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that *Some object had been apprehended'. Nor is evon a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered) ;-by virtue of which it could be asserted that "They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object" as has been asserted by (Kumärila, under Text 2071, above)
Thus it cannot be admitted that "there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered ".
As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by Kumärila in Texts 2067 and in 2068)—" Because it proceeds from Cognition" (2067) and "Because it is Cognition" (2068), those are 'Falsified '(Inconclusive) by such instances as the following:-The Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell, though 'proceeding from Cognition', does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of yellow and also while being Cognition', it brings about the Cognition of the yellow which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do. Hence the two Reasons are 'Inconclusive':-As regards the Cogni. tion of the Yellow Conch-shell', it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell apprehends is only that form of Yellow which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being self-cognised.
'This is the way, etc. etc. With the other Reasons ',--that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.
It has been asked by the other party—“What sort of one-ness of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of Blue, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience ? How can any such idea be entertained As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things ".
The answer to this is as follows:-There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself. As for