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* EXTERNAL WORLD.'
967
TEXT (2033).
ALL THIS COGNITION DOES NOT ENVISAGE OTHER THINGS; THERE IS COGNITION OF THE Blue ;-LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE
COGNITION ITSELF.-(2033)
COMMENTARY.
Whatever is Cognition does not envisage anything other than the Cognition itself, the Cognition of the Blue and other forms is Cognitions ; hence there is apprehension of something embraced by its contrary ; inasmuch as the Cognition' is embraced within the character of not envisaging any other thing, which is contrary to the character of envisaging some other thing. (2033)
The following Texts proceed to establish the Premiss just set forth:
TEXTS (2034-2035).
PRIMARILY, THE COGNITION DOES NOT APPREHEND AN OBJECT AT ALL, AS IT RESTS WITHIN ITS OWN SELF; ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE IMPRINT OF THE OBJECTIVE FORM ; NOR CAN IT BE SAID TO DO SO SECONDARILY (FIGURATIVELY).This REASONING IS ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO REGARD COGNITION AS IMPRINTED WITH THE FORMS OF THINGS, ITSELF BEING LIKE PURE ROox
CRYSTAL.—(2034-2035)
COMMENTARY.
In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of one thing by another ;-what happens is only that Oognition, being of the nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the apprehender of itself. Primarily, in the direct primary sense,--the Cognition cannot be the apprehender of the Object; because all things rest within their own self; and the self' of one thing cannot be the self' of another.
The following might be urged :-“Primarily the Cognition of the Object is not held to be of the samo kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition ; the apprehensibility of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is apprehensibility in the primary sense that is adduced as the Reason in the above Buddhistie arguments), then it is 'inadmissible'. If on the other hand the apprehensibility meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as 'apprehension' in some sort of a way, then such a Reason cannot prove what is wanted. Because the similarity of the words 'go' and 'gavaya' cannot prove the presence of Horns in the Gavaya.-If both kinds of Reason put