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EXTERNAL WORLD.'
979
From all this, etc. etc.'—The sentence is to be construed as-Kalpayanti sati arthamēva anyathā santam kalpayati iti na', - it is not true that, etc. etc.'-This denies what has been asserted by Kumarila.-(2059-2063)
The following texts set forth a series of arguments put forward by Kumarila -
TEXTS (2064–2068). "(a) THAT WHICH IS THE apprehender OF COLOUR MUST BE DIFFERENT
FROM WHAT IS apprehended,—BECAUSE THE COGNITION OF THE ONE DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER ;-AS IN THE CASE OF THE APPREHENDER OF TASTE, ETC.-(6) WHAT IS apprehended MUST BE DIFFERENT FROM THE Apprehender; BECAUSE ONE WHO THINKS OF THE ONE DOES NOT NECESSARILY THINK OF THE OTHER; -AS IN THE CASE OF THE APPREHENDER OF TASTE, ETC.,-(c) FOR THE SAME REASON THE TWO MUST, THUS, BE CONCLUDED TO BE DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, LIKE TASTE, ETC.,-(d) THE TWO MUST BE DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THEY ARE NEVER COGNISED AS BEING OF THE SAME FORM, -LIKE THE COGNITION OCCURRING IN ANOTHER
CHAIN'-(e) THE COGNITION CANNOT APPREHEND ANY PORTION OF ITSELF; BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS FROM THE COGNITION ;-LIKE ITS OWN POTENCY.-(f) THERE SHOULD BE DENIAL ALSO OF APPRE. HENSIBILITY' (OF THE COGNITION BY ITSELF) ;--BECAUSE THE IMPRESSION IS DEVOID OF THE DUPLICATE CHARACTER.-(9) CHAITRA'S COGNITION CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE APPREHENSIBLE PART OF THE COGNITION ARISING OUT OF HIS COGNITION - BECAUSE IT IS COGNITION ;-JUST AS THE COGNITION APPEARING IN ANOTHER PERSON.”—[Shlokavārtika-Shūnyavāda, 172-177)— (2064-2068)
COMMENTARY. "(a) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is apprehended because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Cognition; just as the Apprehender of Taste.-Or (6) what is apprehended, i.e. Colour, etc.,-must be different from its Apprehender; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other ;- just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.Or (c) the two-the Colour and its Apprehender-must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of, - just like Taste and Colour, etc.-Or (d) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form, -- like the Cogni. tion appearing in another. Chain'.-Or (e) the Cognition cannot apprehend & portion of itself, because it is produced from the Cognition itself; like its own Potency;this 'Potency' is what is known as Impression':-(f) Similarly, there should be denial of the apprehensibility of Cognition, which is done in this form The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition ".