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978
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
TEXTS (2059–2063).
IF IT IS ALLEGED THAT" IN THE CASES CITED, IT IS REALLY THE
EXTERNAL OBJECT THAT IS COGNISED "-[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS]:-THE FORM THAT ACTUALLY FIGURES IN THE COGNI TION CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF THE REAL object; AS IT ONLY FIGURES IN THE COGNITION AND HENCE BECOMES COGNISED ; THE ACTUAL FORM OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT ITSELF DOES NOT FIGURE THERE AT ALL. HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT IT SHOULD NOT FIGURE THERE AND YET BE COGNISED? IT IS CERTAINLY A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS TO SAY THAT ONE COGNISES IT' AND 'ONE DOES NOT COGNISE IT'-IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT COGNITIONS ARE self-cognised; BECAUSE SUCH IS FOUND TO BE THE COGNITION IN EVERYTHING WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT'.-FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT “THE WRONG COGNITION, WHILE APPREHENDING THE OBJECT, APPREHENDS IT AS OTHERWISE THAN IT REALLY EXISTS, AND THUS ENVISAGES ITSELF (?)”.(2059-2063)
COMMENTARY.
Kumārila argues as follows:-" In the cases cited of wrong cognitions (like that of Two Moons, Yellow conch-shell and so forth), what is put forward as the basis of wrong cognition is an external object itself in the form of the Conch-shell, etc. only it is in the yellow form that it supplies the basis for the Cognition. Hence there is no 'falsity' (or Inconclusiveness') at all ”.
The answer to this is— The form that actually figures, etc. etc. '-What is meant is briefly as follows -The only right view is that that same form can be apprehended by a certain Cognition which actually figures in that Cognition; otherwise every Cognition would apprehend everything. Thus then, being apprehended' is invariably concomitant with appearing or figuring'. In the Cognition of the Yellow form, the white form does not figure at all ; because what is meant to be perceptible is not actually perceived ; so that the wider character of 'appearing or figuring being absent, there must be absence of the less wide character of 'apprehensibility':--The argument may be formulated as follows - When a certain form does not figure in a Cognition, it cannot be regarded as cognisable (by that Cognition), -e.g. Colour in the Cognition of Sound ; --the white colour of the Conchshell does not figure in the cognition of the yellow form ;-and thus there is no apprehension of the wider character.
One cognises it, etc. etc. This shows that there is self-contradiction.
It is for this reason, etc. etc.-By this passage the Author tries to establish, by the way, his view that Cognition is self-cognised. And this also serves to set aside what has been asserted by the followers of Jaimini (Shabara-bhāşya) to the effect and that—"Our Cognition is imperceptible and formless".