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966
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
TEXT (2032).
THE NATURE OF COGNITION NOT BEING THE NATURE OF THE OTHER THING' [ACCORDING TO THE OTHER PARTY];-HOW COULD THERE BE APPREHENSION OF THE Blue form, WHEN THERE IS APPREHENSION OF THE Cognition of the Blue, - IF THERE IS NO NON-DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THESE TWO ?-(2032)
COMMENTARY.
When one thing differs from another, there can be no certainty of their being apprehended together, except through a constant relationship; as otherwise, there would be incongruities. In the case in question, there is no Relationship in the cognition of the different thing. For instance, if there were such Relationship, it could either consist (a) in being of the same nature or (6) in one being the product of the other ;-(a) in the case in question the Opposite party does not admit the sameness of the two factors concerned ; and in fact, that is exactly what is going to be proved here; (6) nor could the fact of being apprehended together be due to one being the product of the other; because there can be no relationship of Cause and Effect between things that come into existence at the same time, and also because in that case, there should be apprehension of the Eye and the other organs also (which are the cause of Cognition).
Nor can their relation of Object and Subject' be based upon mere simultaneity due to the antecedent circumstances. Because, in that case, the relationship of 'Object and Subject' would have to be admitted as subsisting between the Mind and Mental Effects on the one hand and the Eye and other Sense-organs on the other.-It cannot be said in answer to this that-"what the Antecedent circumstances bring about is the relationship of object and subject in regulated form, and hence there could be no incongruities"; because, in reality, it is this same relation of object and subject' that forms the subject of the present discussion, and as such cannot be admitted as established. In fact, it is only when the constant relationship has become established, that the relation of subject and object' could be there ; and it is this same constant relationship as the basis of the Relation of subject and object, that is being considered now.
Apart from sameness and being produced, there can be no other constant relationship, on which the Relation of object and subject could be based. And we have just arrived at the conclusion that in the case in question) no such relation of subject and object can be based upon the said sameness and being produced. Consequently, apart from these there can be no joint appre. hension'. Why then should the Reason be regarded as having its exclaision from the contrary of the Probandum doubtful -(2032)
A second argument is now put forward in proof of the fact of the form belonging to Cognition :