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EXTERNAL WORLD,
937
that the material substances do not exist at all'; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptiblo facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is not concomitant (with the Pro. handum), in the following
TEXTS (1965-1966).
"IF THE FOUR material substances DO NOT EXIST APART FROM THE
COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS, IDRA), THEN, HOW IS IT THAT THEY ARE DISTINCTLY AND CLEARLY PERCEIVED ?-EVEN WHEN SO PERCEIVED, IF THEY ARE HELD TO BE NON-EXISTENT,
THEN FOR YOU, WHAT WOULD BE THE PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE Cognition
ALSO? "-(1965-1966)
COMMENTARY. Distinctly. This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition ;- and clearly indicates that it is clearly perceived.
This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum Even when 80, etc. etc.'-(1965-1966)
The Answer to the above is as follows:
TEXTS (1967-1969).
WHEN THE EXTERNAL OBJECT IS PERCEIVED-IN WHAT FORM IS IT
PERORIVED? IS IT IN THE FORM OF THE ATOM? OR IN THAT OF A COMPOSITE THING ?-AS FOR THE FORMER, THE FORM OF THE ATOM IS NOT WHAT IS ACTUALLY COGNISED; BECAUSE IN THE COGNITION, THERE IS NO RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL IMPARTITE CORPOREAL THINGS; WHILE, IF THE ATOMS HAD APPEARED IN THE COGNITION, THEY SHOULD HAVE APPEARED AS DEVOID OF ALL DISTINCTIONS OF COMPONENT PARTS ; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT BE * PERCEPTIBLE', FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPRESSING THE COGNITION WITH THEIR OWN FORM.-(1967-1969)
COMMENTARY
If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as one and not-different from the Atoms,-or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms ;-or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.-These are the likely alternatives.
It cannot be the first of these ; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as one and not different from the Atoms; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms; in fact, what is