________________
* EXTERNAL WORLD.'
943
TEXTS (1986-1987).
“AS IS AOTUALLY FOUND TO BE THE CASE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ONE AND THE SAME THING TO HAVE CONTRADICTORY CHARACTERS. THAT ONE THING SHOULD HAVE ONE AND ONLY ONE FORM IS NOT A ROYAL EDICT-IN FACT EVERYTHING HAS TO BE ACCEPTED AS IT IS PERCEIVED." [SHLO V.. Shunyavāda, 219)
(1986-1987)
COMMENTARY.
Kumārila argues thus :-" It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing ;-why :--because it is actually found to be the case.-Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that one thing must have only one form' ;-in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found ; as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same. As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form, as in the form of Being and also in many forms; hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised."-(1986-1987)
The answer to the above is as follows:
TEXT (1988). THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE THERE IS COGNITION OF THE NONENTITY ALSO;E.G. THAT OF THE YELLOWNESS OF THE CONCH-SHELL. OF DIFFERENCE' TOO THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC EXCEPT THE PRESENCE OF CON
TRADIOTORY PROPERTIES. (1988)
COMMENTARY.
If it be as asserted, then no Cognition could be wrong; and there would be an end to all notions of difference '.
It might be possible to characterise that cognition as "wrong' which is subsequently sublated. But even so, when the idea of many' in reference to what is one is sublated, how could it be not-wrong?
Thus it is found that the existence of Atoms cannot be proved either by Perception or by Inference ; consequently the proposition denying the external world does not involve the contradiction of any fact of perception. Nor is the Reason adduced by us inadmissible'.(1988)
In the following text, the Opponent raises the objection that the Reason propounded in the form- Because the Earth and other things are not of