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960
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
Preceiliny one-i.e. the apprehension of the Object.
Remains uncogniserli.e. remains as something of which there has been no cognition.- (2025)
Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition, then in connection with this lutter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form 'I have had the Cognition of the Cognition'; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be pos. tulated another apprehension ;-is without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance ; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions. It cannot be the object that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.-Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could ho effective only in the case of Visual Perception.Nor can the said string of Cognition be regarded as soithout cause. As, in that case, there would be the possibility of its being there at All times.
It might be said that "it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one nfter the other".
The answer to this is as follows
TEXTS (2026-2028).
[TF IT WERE AS SUGGESTED), THEN THERE WOULD BE NO ROOM FOR THE
COGNITION OF ANY OTHER OBJECT. AND YET SUCH COGNITION IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO APPEAR. AND JF THERE IS COGNITION OF ANOTHER OBJECT, THE LAST OF THE SERIES OF COGNITIONS COULD NOT BE COGNISED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION ; SO THAT THAT WOULD REMAIN UNCOGNISED; AND IF THAT IS NOT COGNISED, ALL THE REST OF THE SERIES MUST REMAIN UNCOGNISED ; SO THAT THE ENTIRE WORLD BECOMES BLIND (UNCONSCIOUS).-IF THEN, THE FIRST COGNITION DE REGARDED AS SELF-COGNISED, THEN THE SAME MAY SURRLY BE SAID OF THE OTHERS ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL Cognition ; OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD NOT BE Cognition AT ALL--LIKE THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS.-(2026-2028)
COMMENTARY.
In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness). Because, each succeeding Cognition wonld be the object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause; and so long as it hnd such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objectivo? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not-simply because it is external,- prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition. If, even though external, the Object conld prevent tho Cognition