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956
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIII.
TEXT (2016). "THE ILLUMINATIVENESS OF THE COGNITION OPERATES UPON THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, AND NOT UPON ITSELF, FOR WANT OF THE NECESSARY POTENCY (CAPACITY). [ShlokavdrlikaShünyavada, 187).- AND THE POTENOY OF THINGS CANNOT BE COMPLAINED
or."-(2016)
COMMENTARY.
Question Why should the Cognition not have the potency to illuminate itself ?'
Answer: -The potency of things cannot be complained of' : ns has been thus declared-It is fire alone that burns, not Alrisha, who is to be complainod ngainst for this '-(2016)
The answer to the above arguments of Krmirila is as follows:
TEXT (2017). IT IS THE APPREHENDING OY THE OBJECT ' THAT IS CALLED ' COGNITION. WHEN THEN, IT FORMS ITS OWN ESSENCE, HOW COULD THERE
BE ANY OTHER FUNCTION OVER IT ?-(2017)
COMMENTARY
It has been asserted (under Text 2013) that," while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself".-This is irrelevant. Because the apprehending of the object' is not something different from the Cognition. For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as vitti' (apprehension), 'upalabdhi' (comprehension), 'arthapratiti" (objective consciousness), and 'vijnapti' (ideation). When, then, this apprehending of the object' forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other functioning', in the shape of the 'apprehending of the object-could the Cognition have, apart from itself, by virtue of which it could be said that the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object' ? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.-(2017)
The following question might be raised—“How is it known that the 'apprehending of the object' is of the nature of Cognition, -on account of which Cognition' and ' apprehending of the object' are regarded as synonymons ?"
The answer to this is as follows: