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TATTVASANORAHA : CHAPTER XXIII.
Reliable Word. What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as Perceived' for practical purposes in regard to which it produces
Re-cognition of the form actually apprehended ; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this Re-cognition is as good as notapprehended, even though it might be apprehended. Hence our Renson cannot be regarded as inadmissible'. Specially because what is meant by the clause Pratyayāprativedanat' in Text 1968) is that it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.'
It has been argued (in Test 1972) that "the idea of grossness is a mental illusion " That is not right; because if the Atom had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of grossness be regarded as wrong or illusory ;- as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of permanence is regarded as wrong. As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established ; as they form the subject of the present investigation.
Further, this illusion of grossness cannot be said to be mental', - as it appears quite clearly; while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always indistinct ; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.
The following might be urged :-"Like the non-eternality of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs. For instance, whatever is gross is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things, -as for example, the Hill and other things and the first visually perceived object is gross ;-hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. The qualification 'visually' has been added for the purpose of excluding the "Atomic Diad' (which is not visually perceived)."
The answer to this is as follows :- In the premiss because it is gross', - if it is real 'grossness', as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason),--then such grossness' is not admitted by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the Probandum or in the Corroborative Instance ; and in that case the Probans is inadmissible and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.
If, on the other hand, the grossness' meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowherd, then, even in the case of illusory cognition like Dream, such 'gross form 'actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no aggregate of Atoms' at the time ; and hence your Probans becomes Inconclusive'.
If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you add the qualification there being no illusion', -- then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced during dreams on the other, is not established, there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being free from illusion'; hence the qualification also becomes inadmissible'.
The following might be urged: "Between the normal healthy visual