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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXII.
its own Canso, because it is Consciousness, like the Reminiscent Cognition following niter experience. The Probans addneed here is not Inconclusive'; because on the previous occasion it has been shown by the rejection of the possibility of other canses, that the necessary invarinble concomitance is there.
Then again, if there were no Consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be Death.
If, on the other hand, it be held that"nfter the Body hns becomo entirely deprived of all Consciousness, another Consciousness is produced (on nwakening)",-then, such appearance of Consciousness would mean that there can be no Death at all; because, as in the onse of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dend man also, there would be reappearance of Consciousness. Specially as it is only Mental (subjective) Consciousness that has the capacity to link up the next birth: as has been thus declared * Linking up, Dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjoctive Consciousness is there'.
From all this it follows that Subjective Consciousness rests entirely upon the previous Consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words *Subjective Consciousness must be regarded as inlopendent. The reason for this 'independence consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else. In all cases, this Subjective Consciousness proceedix entirely from its own Cause,-because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the Eye, etc. ;-as is found to be the case during sleep.-- (1928-1930)
The following Text disposes of the charge of inadmissibility' ngainst the Reason just stated :
TEXT (1931).
FOR INSTANCE, CONCEPTUAL COGNITIONS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON SENSR-ORGANS AND OBJECTS, BECAUSE THEY COME ABOUT RVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PUNOTIONING OF THESE LATTER, -AS IN THE CASE OF THE SKY.
LOTUS' AND SUCH THINGS.-(1931)
COMMENTARY Tariavyöpür, etc. etc. Even when there is no functioning of the Sense-organ and the Object. When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. If it wore, it would lead to absurdity (1931)
The following might be urged :-" The Conceptual Cognition of the Sly-lotus and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object --because it comes abont even in the absence of these latter; how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ
