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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXII.
From all this it follows that Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) is without beginning. Or it may be understood that all Cognition, without exception, is without beginning. Because if the Cognition had a beginning. - then, when the Cognition would appear first of all, would it be Sensuous Cognition or Mental Cognition 1-It could not be Sensuous Cognition ; because in the case of men asleep, or in a swoon, or with mind elsewhere, even though the Sense-organs are there, the Sensuous Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions. Hence it is understood that the Sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of Sensuous Cognition; they can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the Mind ; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance. -When too one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing, -it cannot obtain appearance before that from any third thing; as such appearance would be without a cause; as for example, if Smoke were held to proceed from non-fire. When the Sensuous Cognition has come about first of all, it does so only through a favourable mental operation; hence it becomes establishod that the Sense-organ alone can never be its cause; otherwise it would be without a cause ; this is an argument that annuls the said view.
Nor can the first Cognition be a Mental Cognition (the second alternative put forth on bottom of p. 530 of the Sanskrit Text). As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses ; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons.Even if it did appear so,-it should be explained if it would be conceptual (determinate) or non-conceptual (indeterminate) ?-It could not be con. ceptual ; whenever Conceptual Thought operates it operates always as a880ciated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is always sound to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation ; and this expressive verbal iorm of the Conceptual Thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of Convention-or (6) from the fact of Word in the expressive form being a property of the Cognition itself, like the form of consciousness, -or (@) from the comprehension of the meaning of the Word. These are the only alternatives possible.
(a) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of Convention ; because the Convention has not yet been comprehended.
(6) Nor can the second alternative be accepted ; because the essenceform--of the Word is twofold - Specific Individuality' and Universal'. Of these the Specific Individuality of the Word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence on that basis, the Cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the Cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the Blue and other objects. If then, it were the property of the Cognition itself, then the Blue and other things also might be the property of the Oognition itself; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In that case the entire universe would be mere Cognition, and not a modification of Material Substances.