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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXII.
is non-conceptual'.-Because under that view there would never be any Conceptual Cognition at all.-It might be argued that-"in the manner explained before, it could appear later on on the basis of Conception ".-But that cannot be ; so long as the man rests upon non-conceptual cognition, he cannot set up any Convention. Because no Convention can be set up until the Universal Word or the Universal Thing figures in the Cognition ; what does figure in the Cognition however is the Specific Individuality, and no Convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis ; because it is meant for the purposes of Usage, while the Specific Individuality that is seen at the time of the Convention can never be present at the time of usage; consequently it has to be admitted that there is Conceptual Thought before the Convention is made relating to the Specific Individuality. And this is not possible without repeated experience ; so that there also it becomes established that the Cognition in question is without beginning
Then again, if it is not admitted that the first Cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives', then, how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe,-even among animals of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another & source of pain ? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks for the mother's breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it, or having found it suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying the pangs of hunger. Nor has it had any experience of falling from a precipice being a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother's arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice. Until people have had somo actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never in. variably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity.The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there. If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experionce. Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience ; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be without beiginning.
It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicato other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists)-under Texts 1930 and 1940 below. Hence we desist from further details.
Further, if the Chårvåkas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine, -that Material substances are everlasting-becomes upset.-(1886)