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LOKÄYATA-MATERIALISM.
903
alone ? "-There can be no force in this, as it does so proceed; as in the case where the Mind-element is without material embodiment; when a Cognition wants another Cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural and should not be objected to. If it is held that " at the later stages also the Body does help the mental Cognition",--then there would be the incongruity of several chains of Cognition proceeding at once; as the Body which is the Material Cause of the other Cognition would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because whichever Cognition is produced from the Body sets going its own chain of cognitions' which is different from the other Chains ; in this way therefore for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable Chains of Cognition. But such is never found to be the case. .
It might be argued that " when the Body helps the Cognition at the later stages, it does not help as its Material Cause; it is only as a Contributory Cause that it helps the Mental Cognition that has been produced out of itself as the Material Cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects ; so that the Body helps as a contributory cause, and the Cognition does not function entirely independently of the Body at any stage."
This also cannot be true. When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. For instance, the Light, having served as productive of visual Cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way; as has been thus declared Apart from apprehensibility, there is no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing; Colour and other things cannot otherwise be helpful to the Cognition ' If it were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the Effect from the character brought about by its Cause; as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it ; and this would mean that the Effect is without a Cause.
Then again, at the first stage,-apart from the Body being directly productive of the Cognition, you have not noticed in it any other character of the Material Cause. What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause. And as this is present at the later stages also,--why should it not be the Material Cause at those stages also ? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage also, it may not be the Material Cause at all ; as the conditions are the same.
It will not be right to argue that—"At the later stages also, it is the Body itself which, along with the preceding Cognition, would be the Material Cause of each succeeding Cognition ".-Because the possibility of its being such a Material Cause has been already rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the first initial Cognition also would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another Cognition.
It is for these reasons that even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the Teacher, remains applicable- If the Cognition, once produced from the Body, becomes res. tricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be cessation of the Efficient Body?'
