________________
EXAMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA
(JAINA DOCTRINE).
855
If then, what is meant by not having the nature or character of a certain thing' is exclusion by way of contradistinction, then the argument is superfluous; because differentiation of character' among things mutually is what is admitted by both parties.
The compound ' atajjanakarūpalvam' is to be thus explained > That other cause' is the Colour, there is the nature or form of this, which is * atajjanakarūpa ',--and that which doss not possess this form or character of the other Cause (Colour, etc.); that is, it has not the same character or form as Colour, eto. Or, it may be taken as a Karmadharaya first and then compounded with the negative term as Bahuvrihi.-Or again, it may be taken as a throw-membered Bahuvrihi.--[The sonso remains the same under all these explanations).
There arises the following question :-"In the bringing about of a certain effect, why should the independent (unmixed) productive character be attributed to the Eye, etc. themselves, by virtue of which these alone could be restricted to that effect?
The answer to this is that 'In fact, all cognitions proceed, etc. etc. This serves also to answer the objection urged to the effect that--"the dif ference of the Ear from the cognition being the same as that of the Eye, why should not the Ear be regarded as productive of it?".Thus then the 'nature of things being restricted, even when there is difference, it is only one thing that is productive, not the other. Thero is nothing incongruous in this.
If then the Eye, etc. were regarded as productive, on the ground of their having a common character, though different,then that one nature of them would be productive and hence the only Cause ; which would mean that the effect proceods from that alone; and in that case, the other contributary causes would have to be regarded as useless.
If it bo urged that "the one Cause cannot produce the effect, on account of defects in other particulars", then those particular that are regarded . as defective' would be incapable, impotent, why ?-by reason of difference ;
i.e. because they are different from that comprehensive nature which has been regarded as capable of producing the effect in question); and if what is incapable happen to be defective, then that cannot hamper the production of the effect; as in that case anything might conse to be produced at all.
It might be urged that "we do not regard the General and Particular aspects of things to be absolutely distinct, and hence the Roason put forward .by reason of difference' becomes inadmissible".
The answer to this is as follows:-If there were no difference, how could they be defective? That is, if the Particulars are non-different from the General, then it should not be said that 'The one thing is not productive by reason of the defective character of particulars'. Hence, when the General is there in its perfect form, those Particulars that are non-different from that General cannot be defective. When between two things, one does not always share the fate of the other, they cannot be of the same nature'.
