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878
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXI.
The
then there is the same absence of restriction.-The next sentence. Moment, etc. etc. shows this same absence of restriction.—(1831-1832)
TEXT (1833).
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SAID THINGS ARE not momentary, THEN THAT GOES AGAINST YOUR DOCTRINE ; UNDER YOUR DOCTRINE IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT ALL MODIFICATIONS
ARE MOMENTARY.-(1833)
COMMENTARY.
If the other alternative is accepted that the Past and the rest are not momentary-then it goes against your doctrine.-The term • Kränta stands for Siddhānta, accepted doctrine.-The doctrine referred to in that *all modifications are momentary':-(1833)
TEXT (1834).
THE VIEW IN QUESTION IS OPPOSED TO REASON ALSO: IF THE THINGS ARE EXISTENT, THEY MUST BE MOMENTARY, LIKE PRESENT THINGS. THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN THESE TWO TERMS HAS BEEN ALREADY ESTABLISHED
BEFORE.-(1834)
COMMENTARY.
Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to Reason also. For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary-like the Present thing.--the Past and the Future are existent -hence they must be momentary. Previously under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Con. comitance of this probans (Being existent, with the Probandum, Being momentary) has been established. Hence it cannot be said to be 'Inconclusive (Doubtful). Further, 'existence is characterised by capacity for effective action; what is not-momentary is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous and when there is no effective action, there must be cossation of existence also, which is characterised by effective action.
Thus Existence becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.-- (1834)