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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRAIKĀLYA'
879
TEXTS (1835-1840).
ARE THESE PAST AND FUTURE THINGS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE
ACTION? OR NOT ?-IF THEY HAVE THAT CAPACITY, THEN THEY MUST BE REGARDED AS PRESENT', LIKE OTHER PRESENT THINGS. -IF THE PAST ' AND THE FUTURE ' ARE NOT REGARDED AS PRESENT', THEN THEY MUST BE DEVOID OF ALL CAPACITIES,—JUST LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS'. -The Alcāsha AND OTHER NON-PRODUCED ' (ETERNAL) THINGS ARE OPEN TO THE SAME OBJECTION; HENCE THESE CANNOT SERVE TO MAKE OUR REASON INCONCLUSIVE IN THE CASE OF ALL ENTITIES, THEIR RESTRICTED CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION MUST BE DUE TO SOME CAUSE ; IF IT WERE WITHOUT A CAUSE, EVERYTHING WOULD BE USED FOR EVERYTHING. IN FACT, THE RESTRICTED CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A CAUSE; AND THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE PRESENT THING. IN THE CASE OF THE PAST AND FUTURE' ALSO, THE SAID CAPACITY IS THERE FULLY COMPLETE, ACCORDING TO YOUR VIEW; WHEREFORE THEN SHOULD NOT THE CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT' BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM?-(18351840)
COMMENTARY
Further, there are the two alternatives—these Past and Future things are capable of effective action-or not capable. If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as Present',-like those things whose present' character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated-Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present,-as those things whose present' character is not disputed, and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action ; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the Reductio ad absurdum.-The Probans cannot be said to be Inconclu. sive'; because the absence of the Present' character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities,-- just as in the sky-lotus.
-The argument may be thus formulated : Things that are not- Present' are also not-efficient for any action,-e.g. the sky-lotus, and the Past and Future things are not Present'; hence there is perceived in them the absence of the wider character.
Nor can this argument be said to be Inconclusive ', in view of the three * eternal verities --Akāsha, Pratisankhyā-nirodha and Apratisarlehya. nirodha, which do not undergo modifications ;-because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).
Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as Inconclusive' (or Doubtful).
Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause ; otherwise, if it were