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LOKÄYATA-MATERIALISM.
895
MANIFESTED BY, THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCES-EARTH, FIRE, WATER AND AIR; AS, IN THAT CASE, ALL COGNITIONS WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS; AS THE OTHER PARTY REGARD THESE SUBSTANCES AS OP PERMANENT FORM; AND THE IDEA OF A PERMANENT THING REQUIRING THE HELP OF AUXILIARIES HAS BEEN ALREADY REJEOTED. -(1878-1885)
COMMENTARY
That 'Chain' which has been postulated as one has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the same as, or different from, the members of the Chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a non-entity' just like the Series of sky-lotuses'; and we do not base our notion of the
other world upon the states of any such one 'Chain'.-If it is this Chain of Cognitions, etc., called the other world', which you are denying, then, it cannot be right to deny this other world' on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said Chain'; because what is actually perceived cannot be denied. All the denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of beginninglessness and endlessness. But why cannot these endlessness and beginninglessne88,-be accepted ?
If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the first cognition (the beginning), then this initial cognition would be either (1) without cause, -or (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal Cognition or God and so forth, or (3) it would itself be eternal, or (4) it would be produced from any Substance-or (5) produced by a Cognition appearing in another chain. These are the five alternatives possible.
If each cognition in the chain were the effect of another previous cognition in the same Chain,then alone could the Chain be beginningless, not otherwise. That is why the Author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the Chain being not beginningless, and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives).
(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted; as under that view the Cognition would have permanent existence. Things are occasional only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything-why then should it cease to exist ?
(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable ; as for that same reason it would be eternal. Effects become non existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about.
(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted.— "Why ?"-Because of the absence of permanent existence.--The same absence is further emphasised by the words- It would be sheer audacity, etc. etc.'.-This points out the fact of the Opponent's Proposition being contrary to perceived facta.
(4) The sentence 'Nor could, etc. etc. rejects the fourth alternative. * Kroņi' is Earth. This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one that it proceeds from the Eternal God, etc. ; because the four Major Elemental Substances are held by the other party to be eternal.-It will not be right to urge that "the production of the Cognition from an