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LOKÄYATA-MATERIALISM.
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out what is that thing during the absence of which the effect in question does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were accertained were that it does not appear when the other is absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause is really efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also absent; so that it might be conceivable that "these latter are the real causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due ; and as for its absence also during the absence of this other thing (which is intended to be the cause), that may be a mere accident; just as in the case of the absence of date-palm, which grows in a place where the
Mâtyvivāha' (1) generally grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence the qualification, other efficient causes being present, has to be added.It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question only can be the cause of the effect concerned ; its absence being duly followed (by the absence of the effect). There is no such following of the absence of any. thing which renders no help in the bringing about of the effeot; if it did, it would lead to absurdity-Thus it is only through positive and negative concomitance that the relation of Cause and Effect can be ascertained, not in any other way..
There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the Body and the Cognition. For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the positive concomitance between one's own Body and Cognition; because in the Foetus, before the appearance of the Cognition, the Body alone is not perceived ; nor is it perceived apart from the Cognition. As regards the Body of another person also, the Cognition is not one that could be perceptible ; and hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance.-Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomitance ; it is possible to know that when one's own body is absent, his own cognition also is absent, because the man himself is absent ; but it can by no means be ascertained that in the absence of another man's body, his cognition also is absent. Because that man's cognition not being perceptible, even on the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition. It is for this reason that, even in the case of Trees, though the Body is not there, it is not certain that the Cognition is not there; as in this case also there will be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It cannot be right to be certain of absence on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes must necessarily produce their effects. It would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of Cognition in the Tree is due to the absence of the Body or to the absence of its Cause in the shape of the absence of Desire which would be the cause of its having a particular body.
Thus the Reason adduced by us is not inadmissible!
Nor is it contradictory'; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.
Nor again can it be 'Inconclusive '; as that would lead to incongruities : and also it would mark the objector as being devoid of intelligence,