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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXII.
Question :-"What is there to prove that the contrary of the Proposition The Body cannot be the cause of the Cognition is not true?"
Ansider :-This has no force; as the proof is there ; for instance, that the Body cannot be the cause of the purely subjective Cognition' is going to be proved under Text 1930—'Mental Consciousness is independent, selfsufficient, etc. etc.' : specially as it is this subjective Consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies ; which shows that it is not dependent upon the present body; and thus it is that the existence of the other world becomes established.
Then again, the Body may be the Cause of the subjective Consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole or in diverse forms, in the form of an aggregate of atoms ?-Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or without the sepse-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) cause? Or the contributory cause 1-These are the alternatives possible.
Now, the Body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the Cause of Cognition as the very idea of the composite whole' has been already rejected. And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the Four Major Elemental Substances; as a single thing could not have four forms; as, if it did, then there would be an end of all notions of plurality :
Nor can the Body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the Cause of Cognition). Will the Cause consist of the Atoms severally or collectively? It cannot be severally; as in that case the Cognition would arise from onch one of the atoms, just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could it be collectively; as in that case, the defect in any. one of the limbs-like the Nose for instance, -would lead to the contingency of no Cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in oven one of the various ingredients of the Cause of the sprout,-in the shape of the soil, for instance, makes it impossible for the sprout to appear. In fact, when. ever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about, when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them.-It might be held that "all the atoms are the cause of Cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity ". But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause ; as the two causes would be different ; otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointlers. As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens subsequently to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the subjective Cognition at all; and this is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue intact.-It is only in the case of Animals, like the Elephant for instance, that there are changes in the subjective Consciousness, not in the case of human beings; the animals in the infantile stage of the body are dull, while those that have acquired a larger body are cleverer; the improvement and deterioration of the Cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the Effect; hence when, between two things,