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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXII.
to some other part of this same visible world, as is declared in such assertions as The Man is only so much as is perceptible of the senses; and again, • The other world consists in another place, or another time or another state'.
If, on the other hand, the other world' that is denied is something different from the said Chain of causes and effects in the shape of Cognition. etc., then, as such a conclusion is already admitted (by both parties), any proving of it would be futile; as no such other world is postulated by us.
An objection is raised - The Chain being a non-entity, any State that is attributed to it must also be a non-entity : under the circumstances, the other world based upon such limitation could not be real ".
Answer-This does not affect our position. What the term Chain denotes are the members of the chain, which are ontities-these being spoken of, for the sake of brevity, and expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name 'Chain'; just in the same way as the Dhava and other trees (which are real) are spoken of collectively as 'Forest' (though the Forest as such is not a real entity).-(1872-1877)
Question "If it is so, then how was it that the Chain was spoken of as a non-entity under Text 1807, where the Chain or Series has been declared to be usory' (unreal) ?"
Answer:
TEXTS (1878-1885). IT IS BECAUSE IT IS CONCEIVED AS 'ONE' (COMPOSITE), AND IS FEATURE
LESS AND INCAPABLE OF BEING INDICATED EITHER AS THE same, OR As different (FROM THE COMPONENT MEMBERS OF THE CHAIN), -THAT THE CHAIN HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A NON-ENTITY': JUST LIKE THE LINE OF SKY-LOTUSES'.-AS IT IS, WHY CANNOT THE CHAIN BE ACCEPTED AS BEING WITHOUT BEGINNING AND WITHOUT END IF (IT HAD A BEGINNING AND THE FIRST MEMBER OF THE
CHAIN' CONSISTED OF THE FIRST cognition,-THIS COULD BE HELD TO BE EITHER (1) ' WITHOUT CAUSE ', -OR (2) AS PRODUCED BY AN ETERNAL CAUSE, OR (3) AS ETERNAL BY ITSELF,-OR (4) AS PRODUCED FROM ANY SUBSTANCE, -OR (5) AS PRODUCED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION.-(1) THE FIRST COGNITION WOULD APPEAR AT THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE FETUS, AND IT COULD NOT COME ABOUT WITHOUT CAUSE; BECAUSE OTHERWISE, ITS EXISTENCE, WHICH IS ONLY OCCASIONAL, WOULD BE QUITE THE REVERSE (EVERLASTING).—(2) NOR COULD IT BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY SUCH ETERNAL CAUSES AS MIND, TIME, SPACE, GOD, SOUL AND SO FORTH; BECAUSE ON THAT VERY ACCOUNT IT SHOULD BE ETERNAL.-(3) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE SAID ' ETERNAL EXISTENCE IT WOULD BE SHEER AUDACITY TO ASSERT THAT THE COGNITION IS ONE AND ETERNAL; AS DIFFERENCE IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED AMONG THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER THINGS.-(4-5) NOR COULD IT BE PRODUCED FROM, OR