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TATTVASAŠGRAHA: CHAPTER XXI.
and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be 'Present'; that is to say, 'Being Present is invariably concomitant with being occasional'.
Further, if the Entity is really objectively Past' and 'Future, then all 'Embellishments' (or Modifications)'would be everlasting; and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge and other eternal verities'.
It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as 'modified --not Akasha and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said Eternal Verities'.
This is the view that has been held by other people.
This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of modifica. tion-(1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternality. Among these, Birth produces things, Existence leads to their continuance, Decay leads to their decadence, and Non-eternality destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.
Now the question arises-What is that Peculiarity which Birth produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as 'productive' of the Form, etc. - Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives.
It cannot be non-different from Form, etc. ; because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of 'Birth', and as such it would be incapable of being brought about, just as after its accomplishment ; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.
Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc. ; because as it would be different from them, there could be nothing to determine that 'this Peculiarity belongs to that Form'. For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity, as they are held to be different ; if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in. Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible those of container and contained being included under that of being produced. If then the relation of being produced from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, eto. then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone ; and under the circumstances, what would
Birth' do to it 1-It might be argued that "the Form produces the Peculiarity, through Birth".-The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the Birth which can render no help at all. Otherwise it would lead to an absurdity. If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth, just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.
