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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRAIKĀLYA'
873
an active agent ; i.e. it would be inactive; as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the states only. Hence by being different from the States, the Entity could not be an active agent]"-(1810-1815)
The objections against this last view (that "the States are not different from the Entity ") are pointed out in the following
TEXTS (1816-1820).
HOW DO THESE PEOPLE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THERE IS NON-DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE ENTITY AND THE STATES-THEY THE STATES), NOT HAVING BEEN IN EXISTENCE, COME INTO EXISTENCE AND THEN BECOME DESTROYED HOW THEN COULD THEY BE THE SAME AS THE ENTITY IN THE MIDDLE' STATE', THE ENTITY IS ' ACTIVE IN ITS OWN FORM, THEN, AS THE SAME FORM PERSISTS IN OTHER TWO STATES ALSO, HOW COULD ACTIVITY' AND CESSATION OF ACTIVITY' BE THERE IN THESE TWO STATES 1-IY IT IS ' ACTIVE', IN THE FORM OF SOMETHING ELSE, THEN IT CEASES TO BE ACTIVE AGAIN ---IF, LASTLY, IT BE HELD THAT THE FIRE AND OTHER THINGS, IN THE PAST AND FUTURE STATES, ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE SAME IN THE PRESENT STATE, THEN IT IS TRUE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ROOM FOR THE OBJECTION THAT COMINGLING AND CONFUSION WOULD BE INVOLVED ; BUT EVEN SO, AS THE ENTITY IN THE MIDDLE (PRESENT) STATE BECOMES CAPABLE OF FRUITFUL ACTION ONLY WHEN IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AFTER THE TIME DURING WHICH IT WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE, AND AFTER HAVING COME INTO EXISTENCE, IT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST, THERE WOULD BE NO CONTINUITY OF EXISTENCE FOR THE ENTITY (1816-1820)
COMMENTARY How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity 1-No one can accept it. Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed ;-while nothing like this happens to the Entity ; because it has been held to be existent at all times. Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist, how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity ?-They can never bo so; because, they stand upon entirely different footings.-Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times, -just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to non-existence before existence and so forth, --like the form of the States.