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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XX.
Further, the incongruity urged is there in your case also : Presence' or Inclusion' being the same in all things, why does not everything produce everything? Just as, in your case, though the Presence or Inclusion is there in all cases, everything does not produce everything, so it would be in our case also. So there is no force in this.
Then again, even when the difference is equally present in several things, it is only one thing, not others, that produces a certain effect; and this might be due to the restriction on the productiveness of things-on the principle that the nature of one thing is not the nature of the other; and there can be no incongruity in this.
When however, the productiveness belongs to one comprehensive entity, -then one and the same entity would be productive as well as non-productive, -how could these two mutually contradictory affirmation and denial sub. sist in the same entity? There could be no incongruity if they subsisted in different entities. This is what is meant by the words of the text- Ekasya, etc.', 'How could the one thing be both productive and non-productive, etc. etc..
The following might be urged-“We do not regard anything to be absolutely comprehensive (inclusive), on account of which there would be the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive of an effect what we hold is that there is difference also ; so that nonproductiveness would not be incongruous".
There may be difference ; but it has to be explained whether this difference from the productive' nature is meant to belong to the same comprehensive productive nature', or to another. It cannot belong to that same; because there can be no exclusion (difference) of a thing from its own nature; as in that case it would become nature-less (devoid of its character). Nor can it belong to another; if it is different, then, as it would be of the productive nature, and not imperfect, it could not be regarded as nonproductive ; if it were, that would lead to an absurdity.
We grant that that same thing may be different from its own nature;. even so, the incongruity of one and the same thing being both productive and non-productive remains unanswered. For instance, even when the difference is there, it could not be effective in bringing about the one effect in question.
There can be no difference apart from its inclusion (or comprehensiveness); in fact, it would be that same inclusion; so that the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive would still be there. -The term 'anvaya' (Inclusion) here stands for that which is comprehensive or inclusive, i.e. the productive nature. The particle 'nanu' is meant only to emphasise what is said.
Then again, it is found from positive and negative concomitance that the Effect is produced from Particulars only,-hence these particulars them. selves should be regarded as associated with Specific Individualities, which latter therefore do not necessarily indicate the Universal' or General aspect of things; because the character of the 'Entity' consists in capacity for effective action. Under the circumstances, whether the General is different from the Specific Individuality-or non-different from it does not con