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868
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXI.
possible; the said distinguishing however is not possible ; because there can be no such distinction in the case of what is always present in the same form -(1799-1800)
TEXT (1801).
OR (CONVERSELY), BECAUSE IT WOULD BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE ACTIVITY-THE ENTITY, LIKE THE ACTIVITY, WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE PREVIOUS' AND 'LATER' CONDITIONS, AND WOULD HAVE ITS SOLE EXISTENCE IN THE
middle (PRESENT).-(1801)
COMMENTARY. Further, being non-different from Activity, the Entity also would have only such existence as is devoid of the previous and later ends,-like Activity itself.
The compound ' Pūrvāpara, etc.' is to be explained as that which has its all-sole existence in the middle-being devoid of the two ends of the "previous and the later '.-(1801)
In the following Texts the Author laughs at the other party for expounding mutually contradictory doctrines :
TEXTS (1802-1803).
ACTIVITY IS NOT THERE ALWAYS, -AND THE ENTITY IS DESCRIBED AS BEING THERE AT ALL TIMES-AND YET THE ACTIVITY IS SAID TO BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE ENTITY CERTAINLY THIS IS CONDUCT WORTHY OF A DIVINE BEING EVEN IF IT BE HELD THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATES (IN THE ACTIVITY ITSELF) IS DEPENDENT UPON OTHER ACTIVITIES, THE SAME QUESTION WOULD BE EQUALLY WELL RAISED AGAINST THAT
VIEW ALSO.—(1802-1803)
COMMENTARY.
Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the Entities, Colour and the rest, do not exist at all times, as they are non-different from Activity. This is shown in the Text- The Entity, etc. etc.
For the following reason also the Activity must be something different from the Entity- And the Activity is non-different, etc. etc.'.
Divine Beings 'God and the like ; who act and live independently, not minding what is proper and what is improper; and just as their behaviour is unreasonable, so also is the conduct of the philosopher under review.