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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRAIKĀLYA'.
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only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with its varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers".
(4) Buddha-deva (a writer of the second century A.D.)-holds the view that the changes are due to changes in Relativity's-He argues as follows :-"When an object has entered its course of existence, it is called one or the other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. For instance, the same woman is called "mother' as well as daughter'; and the usage in question is also dependent upon the past and the future ; when a thing has something before it, but nothing after it, it is called 'future'; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called
present'; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called past."
All these four Buddhists are Asti-vādins, Realists (upholding the view that things have real and permanent existence),-called respectively: (1)
Mode-changers , Bhāva-vādin, (2) Lalşanavādin, Character-changers', (3) Avasthāvādin, 'Aspect-changers' and (4) Anyathānyathika, 'Relative changers'.
(1) Of these, the first (Dharmatrāta-the Mode-changer) does not differ from the Sankhya, who holds the Modification' theory. So that the refuta. tion that has been put forward against the Sankhya is applicable to this Buddhist Realist. For instance, would the 'modification come about without the abandoning of the previous mode or after its abandonment ? If the former, then there would be comingling and confusion of the Modes. If the latter, then that would be incompatible with the permanent existence of things.
(2) As regards the second view (that of Ghosaka),-here also there would be the same comingling and confusion; as all things may have all characters. As regards the man (falling in love with one woman, which has been cited as an example), he is spoken of as 'attached' (or 'in love') on account of the appearance of. Attachment, which is a totally different thing; and he is said to be 'not disgusted', when there is mere association (meeting together); in the case of the ordinary thing however, there is no appearance of the
character', nor the mere association of character', which would constitute the attainment of it by the thing; as, if it were, then like attain. ment', the character' also would become something different from the thing. Thus there is no analogy between the two cases--the case in question and that of the example cited.
(3) As regards the third view (of Vasumitra),—that the changes in things are due to variations in their aspects or states of activity, --its refutation is going to be set forth in detail below.
(4) As regards the fourth view (that of Buddhadēva), it involves the incongruity of three states occurring under the same state. For instance, under the 'Past' state, the preceding and the succeeding moments would be past' and future and the 'middle' moment would be the present. This criticism against this is quite clear.
The Examination of the Idea of things continuing to exist during the Three Points of Time' proceeds in the Text, only with reference to the