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. EXAMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).
853
TEXT (1763).
"IF IT WERE NOT AS ABOVE, THEN, DIFFERENTIATION BEING THE SAME IN BOTH CASES, WHY IS NOT THE EAR ALSO REGARDED AS PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION OF BLUE, ETC., --JUST LIKE THE EYE, WHICH ALSO IS DIFFERENT FROM
THE COLOURS ? "-(1763)
COMMENTARY.
"The possibility of the Ear also being regarded as the cause of the cognition of Blue, etc. is a proof of the contrary of the conclusion (arrived at • by the Buddhist); but the difference is the same in both cases. The difference
that there is between the Eye and the Blue is the same as the difference between the Ear and the Blue ; i.e. the Ear is as different from the Blue, etc. as the Eye is "-(1763)
The answer to the above arguments of the Opponent is as follows:
TEXTS (1764-1775).
THE 'EXCLUSION' (DIFFERENTIATION) OF THE Eye, ETC. FROM THE Cause
(OF THE COGNITION OF BLUE) IS NOT ADMITTED, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE EYE, ETC. IS ALSO REGARDED AS THE Cause ; AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANYTHING TO BE
EXCLUDED ' FROM ITS OWN NATURE ; IF THERE WERE 'EXCLUSION OF A THING FROM ITS OWN NATURE, THE THING WOULD BECOME DEVOID OF ALL CHARACTER. WHEN EXCLUSION IS SPOKEN OF, IT IS EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER CAUSE THAT IS MEANT; WHAT IS MEANT BEING THAT THE EYE IS not of the form of that other CAUSE ; AND THIS IS QUITE ACCEPTABLE TO US. IT IS NOT THAT WHAT IS PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION IS DESCRIBED PRECISELY AS IT EXISTS. IN FACT, ALL COGNITIONS PROCEED FROM THEIR OWN SPECIFIC CAUSES. IF, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING OF THE SAME NATURE, THEY WERE REGARDED AS A SINGLE PRODUCTIVE CAUSE,—THEN, AS THE SAID NATURE ITSELF IS THERE (AS THE CAUSE), WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF OTHER AUXILIARIES ?-IF IT BE HELD THAT-ON ACCOUNT OF DEFEOTS IN OTHER PARTICULARS, THE ONE (NATURE IS NOT PRODUCTIVE (OF THE COGNITION)',-THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THOSE CAUSES ARE incapable (OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION IN QUESTION), BY REASON OF DIFFERENCE. IF THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCE, HOW COULD THEY BE DEFECTIVE -JUST AS, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE-AS AMONG PARTICULAR THINGS,-EVERYTHING IS NOT THE CAUSE OF EVERY OTHER THING, IN THE SAME