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EXAMINATION OF SYÄDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).
851
form the basis of the same conception are treated as dissimilar', while those that do serve as that basis are regarded as similar' (1758)
Question :-"Why do not all things become the basis of the same conception,-the difference being equally present in all ? "
Answer:
TEXT (1759).
IT IS ONLY CERTAIN THINGS THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS OF ONE AND THE SAME CONCEPTION, THE RESTRICTION BEING DUE TO THE CAPACITY OF THE FORM OF THINGS, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE, AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE Sense-organs AND THE Amrta
AND THE LIKE.-(1759)
COMMENTARY.
No question can be raised regarding the nature of things-such aswhy should Fire, and not Water, burn or be hot? All that can be reasonably asked is-to what is this nature due ? For, if the nature of things were not due to any cause, there could be no restriction, which would lead to incongruities. Hence it should be said that it is due to its own cause ; but then the question would be to what is that due ? And so on and on it would go on to a beginningless series (of causes).
Aksa' is sense-organ. -Amrtā' is the herb Guduchi, and the like' goes with each of the two.
What is meant is that it is only the Guduchi and other herbs that have the capacity to allay fever and other diseases, --not other things. And it is the Sense-Organ, the object, the Light and Attention that have the capacity to produce particular cognitions.
In the same way, it is only certain things to which belongs the capacity to bring about a single conception.
Or, the term akşa' may stand for the Vibhitaka fruit; and the term "and the like 'goes with the whole compound.-(1759)
In the following Texts, the objection is raised that "the Corroborating Instance cited cannot be admitted":