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841
EXAMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).
TEXT (1726).
IN FACT, IF THE THING HAS ONLY ONE FORM, IT CANNOT HAVE DIVERSE PROPERTIES; A DIVERSITY THAT IS NOT A CREATION OF FANCY
IS WHAT IS CALLED PLURALITY':-(1726)
COMMENTARY. This shows that the Reason adduced by the Jaina is contradictory; inasmuch as it proves the contrary of what is intended to be proved. For instance, what the other party intends to prove is real diversity of properties ; but no such diversity of properties ', -which is not a creation of fancyis proved by the Reason adduced ; as one-ness of the thing itself is admitted ; and what is one entity cannot be compatible with Diversity; as Diversity is what is called 'Plurality'; and how can a thing that is Plural be ons ? (1726)
The Corroborative Instance that has been cited (by the Jaina writer) is devoid of the Probandum ', and the Probans also is one that is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.--This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1727).
AS REGARDS THE POTENCIES, THEIR DIVERSITY IS MERELY A CREATION OF THE SPEAKER'S DESIRE TO SPEAK'; HERE ALSO YO DIVERSITY
CAN BE REASONABLE IN WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY ONE.-(1727)
COMMENTARY. The following might be urged (by the other party) :-"Even though Diversity is what is called "Plurality', -why should such real Plurality of a single entity be incompatible -by virtue of which the Reason is said to be contradictory, as proving the contrary of the desired conclusion ?"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1728-1729). THINGS ARE SAID TO BE ONE' WHEN IT IS SAID THIS IS THAT'; WHEREAS THEY ARE SAID TO BE DIVERSE' WHEN IT IS SAID THIS IS NOT THAT'. Being that and Not being that THUS BEING MUTUALLY OONTRADICTORY, CANNOT, IN ANY WAY, BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY one
ENTITY.-(1728-1729)
COMMENTARY. When it is stated categorically that this is that', then the things are said to be one'; as in the case of Consciousness and Spirit. On the