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846
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XX.
TEXTS (1745-1746).
“AS IN THE CASE OF THE Variegated Colour, ONE MAY EMPHASISE ANY ONE COLOUR AS HE CHOOSES, BECAUSE THE COLOUR IS VARIEGATED, - IN THE SAME WAY 'DIFFERENCE' OR 'NON-DIYFERENCE' OF AN ENTITY MIGHT BE EMPHASISED.-(Shlokavārtika-Akyti, 57-58).-WHEN A THING OF A MIXED CHARACTER IS COGNISED SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN ALL DISTINCTIONS LIKE 'DIFFERENCE', 'SAMENESS' AND SO YORTH, DISAPPEAR-(Ibid., 62-63).”
--(1745-1746)
COMENTARY
Kalmāşa-varna -is the variegated colour.-In this case one can fix upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present-regarding the thing either as Blue, or Yellow or Red in the same manner, in the case of the Entity which has a variegated or mixed character,-being existent in its own form, and also non-existent in the form of other things, and also having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular, one can fix upon Unity or Diversity, as he likes. When a man wishes to emphasise the diversity-aspect, then he fixes upon diversity; and when he all at once cognises a thing as being both General and Particular, then all that has been urged regarding its difference or non-difference, etc. disappears ; i.e.it does not apply at all; because what is clearly cognised through Perception is the thing of the mixed character. The objection that has been urged regarding the thing being different or non-different, etc. etc. is as follows: (a) The General thing being non-different from the Particular things in the shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forins like these particular things :-(6) the Particular things, being non-different from the General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General thing :-(c) how could differonce and non-difference, which are mutually contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular? The other objections are such as-Unity and Plurality being mutually contradictory, how can one and the same thing be General as well as Particular -(1745-1746)
It might be argued against the above (argument of Kumärila's) that • If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the Mixed Character and it would not be successive and simultaneous'.
The answer to this (from Kumarila's point of view) may be as follows:
