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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
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ENVISAGES distinction, THEN THERE COULD BE NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE. IF, LASTLY, THE COGNITION ENVISAGES AN imperceptible THING, IS BASED UPON A RELATED OBJECT-AND DOES NOT ENVISAGE DISTINCTION FROM IT, THEN IT IS CLEARLY INFERENCE':-(17021708)
COMMENTARY. It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture of mutually contradictory properties ;-if it did contain such, it would cease to be one thing. For instance, that thing is called Perceptible' which brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, directly, i.e. without the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cogni. tion. On this principle, such cognitions as Sound is momentary would be one envisaging an imperceptible Thing. One and the same thing cannot be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of which anything could be both-Perceptible-and-Imperceptible-as producing and not-producing a certain cognition.
Nor can a thing be neither-Perceptible-nor-Imperceptible ; because in regard to anything, the negation of one character always implies the affirma. tion of the contrary character. If there are more things than one, then there is no incongruity in there being both action and inaction in any given case ; e.g. the action and inaction of Colour and Taste (both) in regard to Visual Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both action and inaction of even one thing, if it is in reference to more things than one; e.g. that of Colour with reference to both Visual and Auditory Perceptions. It is in view of this that the Text says- In any single thing, both action and inaction would be self-contradictory
For all these reasons, things are of only two kinds-(Perceptible and Imperceptible).
Now, if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct Means of Cognition, there could be only two alternatives regarding them—they envisage either (a) the Perceptible Thing, or (b) the Imperceptible Thing.
They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing.--"Why ? "--Because in that case they would be liable to become included under Perception ; as the Verbal and other Cognitions, in that case, would envisage those same things that are envisaged by Perception. It might be urged that "the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception" ;-the answer to that is that
it would be futile'; that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the Cognitions would be invalid,-like Remembrance.
Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions envisage Imperceptible Things)—when the Imperceptible thing is cognised would it be cognised directly, or indirectly, through the intervention of something else 1--It cannot be cognised directly; as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible. Because it is called 'Imperceptible' only because it does not produce cognitions directly ; if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called 'Im. perceptible'?