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CHAPTER XIX.
Section (G).
OnAitihya', Tradition and Pratibhâ', 'Intuition'.
COMMENTARY. There are others who rogard Tradition', etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition.–Of these Tradition is that Means or Form of Cognition whose original promulgator cannot be discerned, but has come down through a long-continued assertion ;- .g. 'A yakşa resides in this Banyan-tree'.
Intuition is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without any restrictions of Time or Place ; e.g. when the virgin has the notion 'my brother will come to-day'; and this does come about; hence it is valid cognition.
The objection to the above is set forth in the following
e.does cortion to
TEXT (1700). TRADITION', INTUITION AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO BE FALSE IN MANY CASES; HENCE THESE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION '; AS SUCH ASSUMPTION WOULD LEAD TO
INCONGRUITIES.-(1700)
COMMENTARY. The phrase and the real includes 'Recognition and others; these also are regarded by some others as 'Means of Right Cognition'.
Would lead to incongruities' e.g. Dream-Oognition might be found to be true in a certain case and thereby come to be regarded as a valid Means or form of Cognition - (1700)
End of Section (G).