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· Gañadharavada
•: 85 :
न च वक्तव्यम्-त्वयि सर्वज्ञत्वमस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धम् " कह सवणु ति मई जेणाहं सबसंसयच्छेई, पुच्छसु व जं न याणामि" इत्यादिना प्रागेव प्रतिविहितत्वात् । कार्यप्रत्यक्षतया भवतोऽपि च प्रत्यक्षमेव कर्म, यथा घटादिकार्यप्रत्यक्षतया परमाणव इति ॥ ६३ (१६११)॥
D. C.-O long-lived Agnibhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of the Karman, which is a multitude of paramānus, in the form of jñānāvarana, etc., for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramānas such as pratyakşa, anumāna, etc., the pramanas which are knowledge. To be explicit, you argue as under :
Karman is not directly perceived, because it is supersensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of an ass.
Other arguments that you advance are the same as men. tioned by your brother in the case of the soul.
But these lines of arguments are faulty. For, this Karman is certainly pratyaksa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realized by you, by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramana can establish its existence. The Karman is either good or bad. The good Karman makes us experience happiness, where as, the bad Karman misery.
This leads to an inference as under :
There is # cause for experiencing happiness and misery since it is a Karya ( an act) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the Karman is pratyaksa to me (1. e. Mahāvara ) it should be so to you. For, there is no such rule that what is pratyakşa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion, a sarbha ( a fabulous eightlegged animal a match for lions and elephants ), a swan, etc. are not pratyaksa to one and all the beings. But, on that account, it is not that they do not exist, for, even children know them. Therefore, there does exist the Karman since
