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Jinabhadra Gaņi's
(The third
The argument stated above is not correct. Svavisayanumāna can be applied only in case of establishing the existence etc. of other vijñānas and visayas and not otherwise. Just as in case of s'abda etc., which are not accepted as existent, one could not establish properties like anityatā by reason of their mere constructive utility; so, in this case also, properties like ksanikatā could not be proved to exist in objects which are not known at all.
Moreover, vijnana which is said to be ksanika and ekalambana, is not able to understand whether there are other jnānas and visayas, and whether those jňānas and visayas possess the property of producing jñana of its own self and sphere. So, if such jnana could not be produced and if the objects in which ksanikatā is to be established are not known, how could kșanikatā be proved to exist at all ?
At this point, the opponent may argue that existence etc. of other vijnanas could be established by the help of sva visayanumana. One would say in this case that “ Just as I exist and my vişaya exists, other jnanas and their visayas also exist, and just as I and my visaya are ksanika, other jñānas and their visayas are also ksanika.” Thus, existence as well as ksanikatū of all the objects could easily be established.
The above objection is entirely fallacious. Jnana which apprehends sarvaksaņikatā is not able to recognize even its own self after its production on account of its being kșanika-as good as dead. Thus, when it is not able to recognise its own self how can it perceive that there are other jñanas and their visayas also ? Such indurable jrana does not recognize ksanikatā of its own vişaya, because, according to them, that jñāna and visaya vanish within equally short time. If that jnana ascertains the kşanikatā of its own vişnya from its disappearance within a short time before the jnana itself dies away, then and then only would the ksunikatā of its
