Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1 Author(s): Nathmal Tatia Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa MujjaffarpurPage 44
________________ NATURE OF VALID COGNITION 33 to the sceptic. Are all things that we believe verifiable by ourselves ? Does the sceptic believe that atoms can be fissioned and atom bombs are made by this process ? He may not have seen the atom bombs or the process of fission of atoms in the laboratory. But if a man disbelieves these scientific inventions, he only makes himself a target of ridicule. What is the basis of our belief in the truth of the scientific discoveries. ? It is certa inly the testimony of trustworthy persons who have first-hand knowledge. If so, why should the sceptic adopt a different attitude to the deliverences of such prophets and seers as the Buddha, the Christ and recent seers like Sri Ramakrspa whose veracity cannot be called in question. We know from the character of such exceptional persons that they are incapable of deceiving mankind and also that they must have had unerring know of these facts and they had no interest in bamboozling persons of limited knowledge. To entertain suspicion of their credentials is scepticism in excelsis. Such being the case the belief in the truth of assertions of holy persons of extraordinary powers does not argue blin superstition on the part of believers. Extreme scepticism should make a man speechless. He wants to convert other people to his way of thinking and combat illusion and superstition because he believes in his extra-perceptual acknowledge of thought of others. It must be admitted that the belief in the infallibility of Karl Marx ultimately red uces itself to faith and not reasoned conviction. If it were open to the test of inference and the like there would not have been difference of opinion among persons whose logical competency is out of question. The Jaina logicians differ from other philosophers in regard to the admissibility of other types of valid knowledge endorsed by the latter as independent genres. For instance, arthāpatti (implication), upamāna (comparison), abhāva (negation), and others endorsed by the Mimamsakas and other thinkers are not regarded by the Jaina logicians as independent types. They are subsumed by them under extraperceptual or perceptual knowledge. As regards negation endorsed by Kumărila, they would not recognize its validity and if it is to be valid it must be included under perception. Kumarila holds that a thing is possessed of a positive and negative character (sadasadatmaka) by virtue of which it is hold to be what it is and distinguished from what it is not. So this assertion is a deduction from the existence of a plurality of entities. If there are many things each thing will have its distinctive individuality unshared by the rest. So negation of the opposite is inherent even in the positive entity. But when such an entity is perceived its negation eludes grasp. Kumārila contends Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.orgPage Navigation
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