Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 138

NAYAS
127
Jainas as the way of the straightline. Its supposed extension into the past and continuity in the future will give it a crooked dimension. Real has only one dimension, the present, and not past or future as the latter dimensions are bereft of causal efficiency. If it is held that an entity has the capacity for a series of causal operation, why should it not produce them all at once and why should it keep power in reserve ? Power means execution and the proof of the power is furnished by the result produced. When a thing remains idle and does not exercise its causal power, it means it has not the power Power and deferred action go ill together. It is only a vain boast if a man affirms that he has power to do a thing but he does not do it for one reason or another. The man must be guilty of braggadocio.
We have dealt with the four nayas occupied with the assessment of objective reals. The first naya gives a miscellany of independent categories coming into mutual relation. It is synthetic-cum-analytic in character. The second is purely synthetic and concentrates on the unity and simple identity of things with all particulars obliterated from its ambit. The third is the opposite extreme of it and ends in particularism, but stops short with individual substances. This is followed up in the fourth approach which ends in disruption of the individual into its component factors, the present living evanescent atoms. This particularistic assessment is carried on to further stages in the three verbalistic nayas which will now engage our attention. These verbalistic appraisals are all called sabdanaya. The fundamental line of argument pursued by the advocates of these nayas lies in the consideration of words and their meaning. Word is the ultimate principle according to the philosophy of grammar. The fact meant by word is only the other face of the word. Word and meaning are the obverse and reverse of the same coin. This is proved by the fact that whenever a word is presented to the mind its meaning is also invariably presented and vice versa. The word and fact are inseparable. So in the assessment of reals, the contribution of word must be taken into account. It may be urged that a man who does not know the meaning of a word or the word expressive of a fact, does understand the word and meaning in isolation. But this contention is not sound. If the particular word denoting the fact is not known, the latter will be described by a generic word. A man may find a pen but may not know its name. He will call it a substance or something like that. Moreover ignorance is not an argument. The blind man's denial of colour does not prove its non-existence. Besides there is a universal language, the language of concepts. This concept is made definite and externalized by a name which makes it communicable. So it