Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 144

CRITIQUE OF NAYAS
133 victory to the Negativist. For instance, the jar is felt distinct from the textile. To be precise, the textile is the negation of the jar and the jar is the negation of the textile. As existence is opposed to nonexistence everything felt as distinct particular must be a manifestation of negation. Thus absolute negativism will be the only respectable philosophy. In order to reject the Negativist, the Vedantist must affirm that uncontradicted experience is the sole evidence of reality. But experience does not endorse pure being as maintained by the Vedantist. In experience we encounter particulars which are both existent and non-existent, existent as it is by itself and nonexistent as another. So neither absolute being nor absolute non being can be the character of reality. But a question has been raised how can being and non-being co-exist together in one substratum. The answer is given by the Jaina that they exist by relation of identity (tadatmya). And being a relation it must subsist between two terins existent and non-existent. The reals as being and non-being are iden tical as substances. But viewed as attributes they are felt to be different. A thing is existent taken by itself and non-existent as understood with reference to another. Being and non-being are one qua substance and felt as two when considered as attributes. A jar is existent as jar and non-existent as water. Existence and non-existence are therefore felt as attributes of the jar which is numerically one and the same substance. The acceptance of this philosophical appraisal brings about a reconciliation between the warring and conflicting reals and preserves the plurality consistently with their unity of being. Vedanta thrives by excluding non-being and Sūnyavāda gloats over the holocaust of being and non-being both.
The verbalistic approach and its three varieties start with the assumption that word is more fundamental than matter. An entity can be understood thoroughly in the light of word. The monistic conclusion of Bhartshari is not accepted by all the advocates of sabdanaya (verbal approach). But their whole perspective has been given a uniform orientation by the tradition of the philosophy of grammar. The fundamental contention that each entity must have a descriptive name is rather a too sweeping proposition. The grammarian makes awareness identical with verbal expression. But there are facts which are too subtle to admit of verbal expression. However much one may combat the contention of the Buddhist philosophers headed by Dignāga and Dharmakirti that individuals are beyond the range of words, one cannot deny that the idea given by a word is a pale representation of an individual. The full-blooded individual can be known by direct intuition. This is the true assessment of experience. Another consideration also