Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 142

CRITIQUE OF NAYAS
131
ence.
concept. This shows that the universal and the particular are not mutually exclusive. It has however been urged that universal and particular have distinctive characteristics. If they are invariably united and not susceptible of differentiation, then all concepts and common names become unaccountable. The distinctive use of the particular and the universal is not based on ontological difference. It is rather dictated by the theoretical and practical needs of a person. When a person is interested in emphasizing the common character, the universal comes out in relief and the particular occupies a subordinate place in his thought. When however a person is interested in satisfying a practical need such as the procurement of milk, he assigns prominence to the particular relegating the universal to the background. The differentiation of the universal from the particular is rather conceptual and is determined by the theoretical interest or practical utility felt by a person concerned. This does not mean that the differentiation is purely subjective. The two are objective reals and their differentiation and distinction rest upon an objective basis. What the Jaina anekanta theory asserts is that the two are not exclusively different nor entirely identical. They stand in the relation of identity-cum-differFurthermore the endorsement of mutually independent universal and particular will open the flood-gate of the objections levelled by the Buddhist on the score of relation. The universal is supposed to exist in the whole and its members, but its manner of existence is not intelligible. If the universal exists in each part in its totality, it will not exist in other parts. Nor can it exist piecemeal because a universal has no part of its own. Again the relation of one part to the other part will be open to the same difficulty as parts excepting the atoms are divisible into minuter parts. Secondly the relation of a new-born individual with the universal presents an insurmountable difficulty. The universal is not present in the individual before its existence and it cannot migrate from other individuals. Again the death of the individual will entail the incidence of the universal either in a vacuum or its disappearance. Both these alternatives are unacceptable. Dharmakirti in his Pramanavārtika has raised formidable objections which stand unrefuted. The Jaina philosopher averts these difficulties by positing the universal as a distinctive property of the individual inseparably combined with the particulars by the relation of identity and difference both. These objections are applicable only to the Nyaya-vaiśeşika conception of universal. We may add that the affirmation of unchanging entities fails to account for their relation with changing particulars. These eternals are not susceptible of change though the relation to changing particulars entails a new relational