Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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Page 145
________________ 134 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1 exposes the weakness of the verbalist. As has been stated by Dandin, the difference of the quality of sweetness in sugarcane, milk, sugar and the like is a felt fact, but it cannot be adequately described by words." As regards the second verbalistic naya which denies synonyms and makes out each word to be expressive of a different fact with a different connotation, it has the support of the Mamāmsist who insists that each word must have a different meaning. But as we have observed, the poets make use of double entendre as a striking literary genre. Whatever may be its logical value, the contention that a word should be used for a thing which has the actualized connotation is rather an extreme position. Both the Naiyāyika and Alaukarika (literary critic) have classified expressive words under four heads. Thus words are (i) yaugika, i. e, entirely derivative. Such words as pacaka=cook, pathaka= reader, denote meanings which are derived from the root and the suffix. But there are words called (ii) rūdha which have meanings entirly underived from simpler elements. For instance, mandapa= pandal (Hindi) is a whole word. There are words called (iii) pogarudha which, though they may be derived from verbal roots. have an ad ditional meaning fixed by convenion. For instance, the word pankaja, with its derivative meaning 'one born from mud' or jalaia, 'one born from water', stand for lotus, a particular species of plants, though there are many things which are similarly traceable to the same origin. The contention of the verbalist which becomes more and more particular. istic in each succeeding assessment is inspired by extremistic bias and unilateral approach. The Jaina logician does not commit himself to any such appraisal but keeps an open mind and does not seek to offend against the convention of the majority of philosophers. Though language is intimately combined with thought, the former cannot be given a higher status than the latter. Knowledge by description falls short of knowledge by acquaintance because the fullblooded particular refuses to be handled by language. These verbalistic assessments have been given a place in the scheme of nayas heir importance is not metaphysically co-ordinate with that of other nayas. The recognition of these nayas is prompted by the consideration that words may be twisted and turned to the advantage of the speaker and demagogues, politicians, lawyers like the ancient sophists of Greece have distinguished themselves by their notorious manipulation of words. Philosophers are also not immune from this 1. ikşukşiragudadinām madhuryasyāntaram mahat / tathāpi na tadākhyātum sarasvatya 'pi sakyāte // Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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