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VAISHALI INSTITUTE REŚEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1
consciousness is not endorsed by the Jaina at any stage. The emancipated soul being free from all hindrances imposed by karmic limitations is perpetually aware of the entire extent of the subjective and objective pla nes of the universe. Accordingly, the qualifying adjective reveals itself and others' expresses a necessary ontological fact.
Now we propose to examine the logical necessity of the other attributes specified in the original text.
The first adjective 'revealing its own self and another also serves to rebut the views of the Mimaņsaka who believes that the different stages of the evolution of the self as congnition, feeling, and will are unperceivable, and that of the Vijñānavadin who denies the reality of external objects. The self is 'the agent' and also 'the experient' of pleasure, pain, etc. These two adjectives are calculated to rebut the Samkhya theory that an atman is not an agent but is an enjoyer of pleasure and pain. But the Jaina contends that the concept of enjoyment necessarily presupposes the agent of the act of enjoying. It has been, however, contended by the Sāmkhya that the concept of the enjoyer, experiencer is rather to be understood as the revealer of the reflection of the changes of the intellect (buddhi) upon the self. The self is pure spirit and without activity. It only reveals the changes of the intellect as cognition, feeling and the like and this is regarded as the experience of the self by transfer of epithet on account of their close association. But even this act of revelation presupposes some agency and activity on the part of the self. If the self does not relinquish its previous state of inactivity, how can it reveal the cantent of the intellect as a new event? The example of the crystal which takes the reflection of the red flower and appears as red does not support the position of the unchanging self. The crystal undergoes a change and has the aptitude for such change and therefore its appearance of redness is an actual transition. Certainly other opaque stones do not exhibit such changes. If the self is to be understood as absolutely inactive and totally repugnant to a change, it should not be believed to reveal the mental states.
There are two theories of reflection as quoted by the commentator Siddharşi. The intellect is compared to a mirror and the images of objects which are the contents of the intellect, presuppose primary reflection. The intellect again endowed with the reflected objects as its contents casts its reflection on the pure self. This second reflection is called enjoyment (bhoga) by Vadamahārņava,' a work lost, and it is now
1. See Nyayāvatāra, p. 97.
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