________________
ANEKANTA
109
one substance though they are different from the substratum, what would be the manner of their existence ? If these characteristics exist in a substance without partaking of a common nature with the latter, why should they occur in a particular substance and not another ? There is no ontological nexus between the substance and the attributes. It is argued that they belong to the substratum by the relation of inherence. But does this inherence make a change or confer a benefit on the related facts ? If there is no such benefaction it could exist anywhere else. If however it is admitted that there is a relation of benefactor and beneficiary, then you will have to admit that inherence confers benefit on the terms and this mode of benefaction must differ with the terms. The way in which inherence benefits the substance must be different from the way in which it benefits the attributes. But this admission would invest inherence with a dual character, if not more, and this also will be the case with the beneficiary which receives an additional attribute from the relation. The postulation of different potencies in the relation and the relata will further complicate the issue. How would this potency relate to the terms in relation ? If these terms and the relations are absolutely different from one another and have no intrinsic foundation in their very nature, they will all fall apart and the real qua whole will simply vanish. The Naiyāyika realist who swears by the independence of the categories must admit that an entity is possessed of multiple characters by its very nature. If so the entity under consideration ceases to be a simple fact without intrinsic difference. It is more honest and straightforward to admit that the constitution of entities intrinsically and ontologically is a complex in which these apparently different and recalcitrant facts, substances, attributes and relations are accommodated without conflict. A pure simple with no characteristic attribute and no internal and external relation is uncharacterizable, that is to say, without any character. To erect such a non-descript abstraction into ontological real is condemnable on the very face of it, as neither experience nor logic can vouch for its existence as proof. It must therefore be admitted under pain of self-contradiction that entities which are apprehended by experience without a flaw, that is to say, without any defect in the organs of perception, must be accepted in terms of experience. To deny the validity of experience which is neither vitiated by defective conditions nor superseded by contrary experience will lead to unrelieved scepticism, endorsed by the Madhyamikas or to a large extent by Vedāntic monism.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
