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ANEKĀNTA
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condemns all conditions of validity on the analogy of dream'experience. But this is an irresponsible and unwarranted generalization. As there is no limit to irresponsible assertion one might contend that all cognitions are valid like the cognitions of wakeful experience. The Sünyavādin may rejoin 'You also admit that dream.experience is false and you cannot challenge the assertion of invalidity of all cognitions on the analogy of dream-experience. But the Sūnyavādin takes the assertion of the opponents regarding the invalidity of dreamexperience as true. Why should he not accept his another assertion of validity of wakeful experience? The realist may confront the Śanyavādin with a dilemma. Do you believe that our beliefs are cognizant of truth or not? On the former alternative, the Śūnyavādin will abandon his theory. On the latter alternative, he should not go further a field to adduce dream-experience as the instance of false belief. But if he does not believe in the authenticity of any proposition, the proposition of universal invalidity will also be exposed to the same charge. If belief in the falsity of all beliefs will end in selfcontradiction, this belief at least will not be false according to him. And so at least one belief is found to be true and this makes the blanket contradiction self-contradictory. If he admits that his belief is false, it will not prove the falsity of other beliefs. Even in the assertion of the falsity of all beliefs, the truth of the assertion will remain uncontroverted. The upshot will be the assertion of truth and falsity in the same breath and this will indirectly pay tribute to the fundamental position of the Jaina that things are possessed of dual character which though apparently incompatible has yet to be accepted as the true assessment of facts.
We however think that an argument with the Sunyavādin is unprofitable because whatever drawbacks may be exposed in his assertion he will simply parry it by the reply that it is not his position. He will always say 'My ridges are unrung'. But there is no scope for doubt whether a thinking person can rest content with contradiction of all assertions, positive and negative and yet refuse to be committed to the opposite alternative. The proposition 'nothing is true' is not a selfcontradictory proposition like a barren woman's son or a square circle. But the contradiction is at once encountered when one contemplates it. The contemplation and still more the assertion of the proposition are bound to involve the sceptic in self-contradiction. As Descartes has said that one cannot doubt that he is in doubt. He is anticipated by Gautama and Udayana (of the 10th century A.D.) who asserts that doubt presupposes certitude."
1, Nyāyakusumāñjali, Chap. 1. Nyāyasūtra, II 1-7,
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