Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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Page 127
________________ 116 VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I NAYAS The problem of valid cognition qua organ (pramana) understood in the instrumental sense and qua result as understood in the sense of an act or fact has been discussed from all possible points of view sponsored by the different schools of philosophers. There is sharp difference of opinion on the nature (svarupa or lakṣaṇa) of valid knowledge and its number (samkhya), function (vpāpāra) and scope or jurisdiction (gocara). The Jaina philosopher entered the arena of formal logic rather late and thus had the advantage of making criticism of the different theories and propounded his own theory in consonance In the course with his fundamental metaphysical and religious creed. of deliberation and critical appraisment the Jaina logician sharpened and polished his own logical apparatus and with its help has been able to arrive at certain astonishingly original conclusions. Though much has been written on Jaina logic there is still room for elaborate consideration and evaluation of the logical theory. It is a matter of congratulation that many a work on Jaina logic and epistemology has been brought to light in original Sanskrit. The theory of multiform evaluation known as syadvada and the promulgation of nayas, i. e. different approaches and ways of assessment are rightly claimed by the Jaina logicians as their original contributions. We shall dwell on syadvada in the next section and pave the way for its correct appraisal by the examination of the different nayas which may be tentatively translated as ways of approach and assessment of reals. In the preceding discourse we have shown that each real is possessed of an infinite multiple character and all cognitions, valid or invalid, have to reckon with multiform and multinatured facts. Even illusions and errors are of necessity concerned with reality however much they may go astray. Error is not total error and there is an element of truth coupled with falsehood. The totalitarian conception of error sponsored by the Buddhist Madhyamikas has not been able to secure adherence from other schools of thought. It has also been shown that even accredited authentic cognitions are by their very nature concerned with segments of a real. And the total reality can be envisaged with all its fullness only by a super-intuition (kevalajñāna) transcending all limits and barriers. This supernal intuition culminates in omniscience which is the final consummation of knowledge. A real has to be approached from all perspectives and the syadvada which is formulated in sevenfold predication is a typical 1. pramiyate anena. 2. pramiyate paricchidyata iti pramaņam phalam bhavasadhanam. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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