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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
different shapes reflected in the content, the cognition is believed not to shed its unity. The cognition and its contents are not ontologically different and therefore unity and diversity must subsist together without a hitch. So the denial of the multiple character of reals cannot be a true estimation of reals internal and external, as the plurality of contents and the unity of cognition have to be reconciled consistently with extra-mental reality. This is achieved by implicit endorsement of multiformity of reality and the protestation of the Sautrántika only betrays his desperate attempt to pass the buck.
Let us now examine the position of the Buddhist subjectivist (vijñā navādin). The subjectivist does not believe in the reality of extern al objects and the perceived plurality, acording to him, has no existence outside the mental state. But the unity of consciousness and the plurality of its contents can be accounted for by the supposition that unity and plurality are not irreconcilable opposites. A cognition is neither absolutely one nor absolutely many but both together. This is the position of anekanta. But the subjectivist may contend that plurality of contents is only a false appearance and therefore does not affect the integrity of consciousness. This line of defence is adopted by all idealists. The subjectivist cannot therefore refute the claim of the Vedāntic monists that one Absolute Brahman is the only reality and the plurality is only an appearance. But though subjectivism may lead to objective absolutism by natural logical transition, the realist does not accept this transition as the ultimate character of reality. Even in the Monistic theory the unity of consciousness is not directly realized. Were it so, all persons would achieve emancipation. The Vedāntists assert that all our imperfections cease as soon as the unique reality of the Absolute is realized. But though the Absolute Brahman as consciousness compact is not realized, it is not unfelt altogether, since that would make the appearance of plurality imposssble as in dreamless sleep. However the Vedantist also will have to admit that absolute consciousness, though it is the only reality, is noticed as consciousness and at the same time remains unnoticed as one unitary principle. This combination of noticeable and unnoticeable traits will invest the Absolute with dual character in spite of their apparent incompatibility.
As for the Šunyavādin, the Absolute Negativist, it is un profitable to enter into a controversy with him since he does dot believe in the validity of knowledge. But how can he distinguish between truth and error, valid and invalid cognition ? The falsity of the cognition is proved by its subsequent contradiction. One sees water in the mirage,
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