Book Title: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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Page 112
________________ RESULT OF VALID COGNITION denied. So one should not assume a dogmatic attitude regarding the possibility or impossibility of omniscience. Hemacandra has given other arguments for the proof of omniscience. The progressive development of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere since this is the way of all progression. This argument proves knowledge ne plus ultra. We refer the curious student to the works of Jaina logicians, the Pramaṇamīmāmsā, Syadvādaratnākara, etc. The Buddhist also believes in the omniscience of the Buddha and has waged a relentless war against the Mīmāmsakas. I may refer the reader to my paper "The omniscient as the founder of Religion' published in the third volume of the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication. It is an intriguing problem of religion and nobody who believes in religion and in the infallibility of a prophet or a scripture has to face the barrage of arguments of the sceptic or the practical work-a-day man who believes in the testimony of his resources. Scepticism is now in the air and anything that smacks of super-sensuous beliefs is held to be suspect. We may observe that if belief in transcendent reality be held to be a dogmatic, superstitious and uncriticized article of faith, the unqualified denial of this possibility is equally open to the accusation of dogmatism. It may not be possible to prove the existence of God, after-life, immortality of soul with mathematical certainty, but the denial of these concepts is also liable to be arraigned on the charge of dogmatism. Arguments of philosophers who exult in their scepticism have not been able to disabuse the honest believer of his unwavering faith. And perhaps these matters are not competent to philosophical treatment. Philosophy is guided by logic and logic, as we understand, is derived from experience. It is empirical per se and not competent to prove metempirical facts. It is more rational to hold one's doubt in abeyance and adopt a non-committal attitude, if he is not satisfied with the professions of scriptures. The author has disposed of the question of definition and number of cognitive organs and the differences of philosophers on these topics, The subject matter of valid cognition now deserves to be treated and so also the consequences of it. But as the former requires elaborate treatment and there is sharp difference of opinion among different schools of philosophers, he defers its treatment and immediately takes up the question of the results and consequences which emerge from valid cognition. Text pramapasya phalam sākṣādajñānavinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekṣe Seṣasyādānahānadhiḥ // Jain Education International 101 For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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