Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 113

102
VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1
Translation “The immediate consequence of valid cognition or a cognitive organ (for that matter) is the elimination of ignorance (of the subject). The consequences of transcendent cognition are supernal bliss and equanimity, and the awareness of (feasibility of) acceptance and avoidance are (the consequences) of the rest.” ... (XXVIII)
Elucidation A cognitive organ or a valid cognition for that matter which are ontologically the same thing produces twofold result, immediate and mediate. The immediate result is the elimination of ignorance of the object of proof. It is apparent that the object was unknown before its revelation by a cognitive organ. This emphasis on the expulsion of ignorance furnishes the raison d'etre of the inclusion of the adjective 'previously unknown' to the object of valid cognition. The object of valid cognition must be one that was not known immediately before the cognition. This is regarded as the universal condition of valid cognition by the Buddhist, the Vedāntist and the Mimāņsaka. The admission of the necessity of the expulsion of ignorance as the innmediate result of valid cognition on the part of the Jaina logician is tantamount to the admission of the logical necessity of the adjectival clause 'previously unknown'as qualifying the object of valid cognition. The objection of the Jaina to this additive qualification is therefore not to be understood as a case of rigid exclusion. It is implied that the object of cognition must be previously unknown; otherwise a cognitive organ would have no specfic function of its own which consists in the elimination of antecedent ignorance. The objection of the Jaina logician to the inclusion of the specific adjective in the definition of valid cognition is inspired by the consideration that the previous ignorance of the object is a common universal characteristic of all valid cognition and so specific statement is pointless. The knowledge of a known fact is regarded by the Mimāņsaka and so also the Buddhist and the Vedantist as a useless repetition which does not make any special contribution, though the repetitive experience cannot be convicted of intrinsic invalidity. It is for this reason Dharmakîrti does not accord the status of valid cognition to reflective judgement (vikalpa) falling upon immediate perception of the sense-datum. For instance, the jar is perceived as a unique fact (svalaksana) and the perception, though indeterminate, is vivid and lively. It is not analysed into a substantive and adjective, subject and predicate, because the Buddhist thinks that the quality of a thing is not and cannot be sundered without doing violence to the unity of the object.