Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 64

SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE DEFINED
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others. For instance, the Buddhist (Dignaga) asserts that the number of probanses is three only, namely (1) non-perception, (2) essential identity and (3) effect, which are possessed of three characteristics, namely, (1) existence in the subject (minor term) and (2) in the homologous instances (sapaksa) and (3) non-existence in the heterologous instances (vipaksa). The Vaiseşika asserts that inference follows on the knowledge of the probans (1) as the effect of, (2) as the cause of, (3) as one which is conjoined with, (4) as one that is inherent in, and (5) as one that is opposed to, the probandum. The aphorism is explained as follows: The effect leads to the inference of the cause. Thus when a river is seen in spate carrying logs of wood etc., it is inferred that there has been rainfall in the upper region through which the river makes its course. The cause also may be the probans of the effect as probandum. The particular gathering of cloud in horizon gives rise to inference of the impending rainfall as its effect. It may be urged that such inference is liable to be set aside on the ground of uncertainty. The emergence of cloud in the horizon is often found to fail in the production of a shower. It is also found that scorpion is generated by a scorpion, a cow-dung and a snake as popular belief goes. So the inference of the cause from the effect and the effect from the cause is found to be contingent. But the Vaiseșika observes in defence that the effect and the cause with specific features never fail to produce correct inference of the cause and effect respectively. If one fails to notice this specific character of the effect and the cause and brings forward the charge of inconclusive probans, the fault lies at the door of the superficial observer and not on the part of the probans concerned. The illustration of the probans conjoined to the probandum is inference of fire from smoke which is conjoined with fire. It cannot be contended that conjunction is a relation which qualifies both smoke and fire. Why should then the smoke serve as the probans of fire and not fire as probans of smoke? This objection, the Vaiseşika observes, is nothing but a cavil. The same objection may be raised against the concept of necessary concomitance which subsists between the probans and the probandum and as such belongs to both. So the counter question may arise why should smoke and fire, being possessed of concomitance alike be not regarded as mutually competent ground of inference? Clearly it is a captious objection and not entitled to serious consideration. The illustration of the inherent
tattulye sadbhāvo
nāstitasati/
niscitanupalambhātmakāryākhyā hetavas trayaḥ//
1. anumeye' tha
Nyayavatāra vivrti, p. 34.