Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 89

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
The two forms of statement have been endorsed but the statement of both is not only unnecessary but also will be regarded as a drawback on the part of the arguer, since anyone of these ways of statement will perforce establish the truth of the thesis, that is to say, the presence of the predicate, say fire in the subject. The syllogistic argument as a statement is called in request only for the proof of the thesis to the satisfaction of the Council (parişad) and the opponent. Either of these statements is sufficient to ensure the emergence of inference in the umpires and the other party. The statement of both on the other hand will be taken as symptomatic of the stupidity of the arguer, since another statement is useless for the purpose of carrying conviction. Superfluity of words is strictly tabooed in logic and even in literary composition it is regarded as a fault.
Now the definition of illustration or example (dy stānta) is given in the next verse. It is of two kinds as it is based on similarity and on dissimilarity. Of these two the example based on similarity is defined as follows:
Text
sådhyasadhanayor vyāptir yatra niściyatetarám/ sādharmyena sa drşļāntaḥ sambandhasmaranănmataḥ 11
Translation “The example, in which the necessary concomitance of probans and probandum is understood a fortiori (without leaving any room for doubt), is regarded as one based on similarity. It is endorsed in order to stimulate the memory of the necessary concomitance.” ... (XVIII)
Elucidation
Similarity of the example with the subject is based on the possession of the similar coincidence of the probans and the probandum. To take a concrete instance 'There is fire in the hill because of the smoke, which can exist only on the existence of the fire, as in a kitchen'. The kitchen is a place where both smoke and fire are observed. The observation of the mere coincidence of smoke and fire even in a large number of cases does not ensure the necessary and universal occurrence of both smoke and fire, since it extends to all such cases past, present and future. The observation in question is a perceptual cognition and as such is confined to the present data. It will be discussed in the course of our deliberation that another organ of knowledge is necessary for the ascertainment of the universality and necessity of the relation between smoke as a class. and fire as a class. An example cited does not serve as proof of it but only as an aid