Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 102

FALLACIES
91
a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) also: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a Brahmaṇa on the ground of the Brahmaṇahood of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required".
Likewise, a reason 'which is lacking in definite proof of its existence', that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and (also) is lacking in necessary concomitance' is also a case of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called 'doubted-cum-non-existent'. Thus, for instance, (this fallacy occurs when) a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour is adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of 'its having a quality perceived everywhere', (the fallacy being) due to the fact that there is no proof (in support of the truth of the reasons advanced).1
It
As neither the original writer Siddhasena nor its commentator has given specific instances of fallacious reasons, we have to quote from other manuals of Indian logic, the examples for the edification of the students uninitiated in the niceties of logical classification. seems that these authors presume that the readers of the Nyajavatara will supplement their knowledge with further details from other works. At any event a student who wants to have the knowledge of the fallacies and their sub-divisions will be disappointed as these things are not treated in the karika. It was expected that the commentator would supply these details as is done elsewhere. But he presupposes that only advanced scholars who are well posted in the logical discipline and their nice divisions, definitions and classifications will study this work. The commentator engages in the discussion of the philosophical positions of the Buddhist and the logicians of the Nyaya-Vaišeșika schools and shows that all their arguments and concrete illustrations are exposed to these fallacies. Let us take a typical example of the Buddhist : 'All existents are momentary, the jar is an existent, therefore the jar is momentary'. The commentator quotes all the arguments of the Buddhist to prove his thesis by making existence equal to causal efficiency. It is argued
1. A Critique of Organ of Knowledge, pp. 144-45.